Suchergebnisse

In 2012 the Nobel Committee awarded the European Union (EU) its Peace Prize. It commemorated the building and sustaining of peace between Europeans, a process in which the Nobel Committee proposed that the EU and its predecessors had played an important part. It explicitly commen-ded the Union's success in repeatedly reconciling a divided continent and complemented its efforts to build peace beyond its borders. But does the EU (continue to) deserve such praise? This contribution examines European peacebuilding from the early inte-gration of post-World War Two economies, through the uniting of Europe after the Cold War to contemporary conflict management efforts in the Western Balkans and the Eastern neighbourhood. The purpose of this endeavour is to examine whether lessons from the European experience can be observed that may facilitate future regional stabilisation processes – within and beyond the Union.

Over the last decade, the EU has established itself as a player in the international field of conflict management. Both its civilian missions and military operations have played a significant part in this development. This article takes a closer look at the EU's military endeavours in conflict management. It presents a theoretically grounded definition and a corresponding set of criteria for success in military conflict management and evaluates the operations accordingly. The article provides a comprehensive review of all the EU military conflict management operations to date. The analysis is structured and focused around the criteria for success, which provides a more nuanced picture of the Union's operational achievements throughout its first decade in military conflict management.

Observers have classified the European Union (EU) as reluctant in its implementation of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) (Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, 2013). This contribution revisits that argument by employing a more nuanced interpretation of norm implementation than the binary conceptualisation typically applied. By appraising EU reactions to the 2011 Libyan crisis, we investigate whether a "European practice of mass atrocity prevention" is emerging and if so how this relates—or not—to R2P. We do this by investigating EU practices seeking to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity—paying particular attention to the three pillars and four policy areas included in the R2P framework (ICISS, 2001). Our review of EU responses to Libya seeks to unveil whether and if so how EU practice related to mass atrocity prevention in that country rejected, adopted or indeed adapted R2P. The enquiry appraises both how R2P mattered to the EU response and how the Libya crisis affected the Union's approach to mass atrocity prevention and within it R2P. In this way, the study asks how norms can change practice, but also how practice can change norms. As such, our focus is on the inter-relationship between principles and practices of protection.

Observers have classified the European Union (EU) as reluctant in its implementation of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) (Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, 2013). This contribution revisits that argument by employing a more nuanced interpretation of norm implementation than the binary conceptualisation typically applied. By appraising EU reactions to the 2011 Libyan crisis, we investigate whether a "European practice of mass atrocity prevention" is emerging and if so how this relates—or not—to R2P. We do this by investigating EU practices seeking to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity—paying particular attention to the three pillars and four policy areas included in the R2P framework (ICISS, 2001). Our review of EU responses to Libya seeks to unveil whether and if so how EU practice related to mass atrocity prevention in that country rejected, adopted or indeed adapted R2P. The enquiry appraises both how R2P mattered to the EU response and how the Libya crisis affected the Union's approach to mass atrocity prevention and within it R2P. In this way, the study asks how norms can change practice, but also how practice can change norms. As such, our focus is on the inter-relationship between principles and practices of protection.

Observers have classified the European Union as reluctant in its implementation of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P). This contribution revisits that argument by employing a more nuanced interpretation of norm implementation than the binary conceptualisation typically applied. By appraising EU reactions to the 2011 Libyan crisis, we investigate whether a "European practice of mass atrocity prevention" is emerging and if so how this relates—or not—to R2P. We do this by investigating EU practices seeking to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity – paying particular attention to the three pillars and four policy areas included in the R2P framework. Our review of EU responses to Libya seeks to unveil whether and if so how EU practice related to mass atrocity prevention in that country rejected, adopted or indeed adapted R2P. The enquiry appraises both how R2P mattered to the EU response and how the Libya crisis affected the Union's approach to mass atrocity prevention and within it R2P. In this way, the study asks how norms can change practice, but also how practice can change norms. As such, our focus is on the inter-relationship between principles and practices of protection.

Observers have classified the European Union (EU) as reluctant in its implementation of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) (Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, 2013). This contribution revisits that argument by employing a more nuanced interpretation of norm implementation than the binary conceptualisation typically applied. By appraising EU reactions to the 2011 Libyan crisis, we investigate whether a "European practice of mass atrocity prevention" is emerging and if so how this relates—or not—to R2P. We do this by investigating EU practices seeking to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity—paying particular attention to the three pillars and four policy areas included in the R2P framework (ICISS, 2001). Our review of EU responses to Libya seeks to unveil whether and if so how EU practice related to mass atrocity prevention in that country rejected, adopted or indeed adapted R2P. The enquiry appraises both how R2P mattered to the EU response and how the Libya crisis affected the Union's approach to mass atrocity prevention and within it R2P. In this way, the study asks how norms can change practice, but also how practice can change norms. As such, our focus is on the inter-relationship between principles and practices of protection.

Observers have classified the European Union (EU) as reluctant in its implementation of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) (Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities, 2013). This contribution revisits that argument by employing a more nuanced interpretation of norm implementation than the binary conceptualisation typically applied. By appraising EU reactions to the 2011 Libyan crisis, we investigate whether a "European practice of mass atrocity prevention" is emerging and if so how this relates - or not - to R2P. We do this by investigating EU practices seeking to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity - paying particular attention to the three pillars and four policy areas included in the R2P framework (ICISS, 2001). Our review of EU responses to Libya seeks to unveil whether and if so how EU practice related to mass atrocity prevention in that country rejected, adopted or indeed adapted R2P. The enquiry appraises both how R2P mattered to the EU response and how the Libya crisis affected the Union's approach to mass atrocity prevention and within it R2P. In this way, the study asks how norms can change practice, but also how practice can change norms. As such, our focus is on the inter-relationship between principles and practices of protection. (author's abstract)

The objective of this brief is to analyse the contribution that the 2013-2014 EU CSDP mission EUBAM Libya made to the overall security situation and border management in Libya. Given this objective, the following question is raised: Why did the EU Border Assistance Mission fail, and could anything have been done differently?

When South Sudan gained independence in 2011, the new country needed assistance from external actors during the transition to prevent the security situation from deteriorating. In 2012 the EU launched its Aviation Security Mission (EUAVSEC) in South Sudan as part of its Common Security and Defence Policy. This came in response to a South Sudanese request for EU support and assistance in strengthening the security in Juba International Airport, as it had proven difficult for South Sudan to establish a fully operational transport hub. The EU estimated that an improvement of the airport security would contribute to the fight against crime and international terrorism, but also allow for a greater flow of people and goods, which in return would increase trade levels and promote regional integration. The mission, however, never reached full operational capacity, and due to an overall deterioration of the security situation in the country, all EU personnel were evacuated in January 2014, and the mission was (informally) terminated after fulfilling its mandated deployment period. Even though the mission had succeeded in training 350 personnel prior to the evacuation, its contribution to the overall security situation in South Sudan was limited, partly due to a misguided mission objective. Despite its shortcomings, the EUAVSEC mission can provide valuable lessons for future CSDP missions and operations.